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Effective learning needs to be as existential (and, in a sense, 
as experiential) as possible and that involves more the 
pragmatics rather than merely the semantics of words. The 
initial system of signification that enables one to 
process/grasp concepts is crucial in whatever one will do with 
those concepts subsequent to their acquisition. Since students 
come to school from a background of conceptuality informed 
by their First Languages, learning would be more meaningful 
and effective if it is carried out in those languages. During 
instruction in any language, effective learning will take place 
only when the experience behind the sign or word or what the 
word points to is emphasized more than merely the knowing 
of the word itself. Nevertheless, the sign/word that initially 
points one to the concept determines the possibilities of what 
you will do with that concept afterwards, hence the 
importance of First Language instruction. My paper seeks to 
explore how the relationship between signs/words and 
concepts impacts on conceptuality in general, and how this 
would be reflected in an instructional setting where a foreign 
language is used, specifically. Adopting Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s triadic model of the organic relationship between the 
sign and the referent (in a pragmatic sense), the paper argues 
that the relationship between signs and referents is not as 
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An ontology of language: its source and place in First Language 
situatedness 
Arguments for the advantage of First Language Instruction have already been 
advanced in various studies (see Mtenje, 2002; Heugh, 2001; Pota, 2001)1. My 
task in this paper is to lend weight to these arguments by entering the debate 
from a branch of philosophical studies called ontology. Simply put, ontology 
is the study of “being” or “becoming” and, for humans and animals, 
consciousness is at the “centre” of an investigation into their being or 
becoming. Specifically, I want to approach the matter from developments in 
current studies in the physicalist school within philosophy of mind (i.e. that 
the mind is as physical as the rest of the body and that it exists on a continuum 
with it). I will also explore how the position posited in the physicalist school 
relates to human and animal consciousness. In a consideration of that state of 
being, the relationship between language and subjectivity, or language and 
consciousness is crucial. The principal question is: What is the relationship 
between language and conceptuality, and how does that relate to the question 
of the languages of instruction used in schools? 
 
At this stage, I need to note with liberatory approaches in various fields, 
notably of pedagogy, such as those propounded by the Brazilian educator and 
social reformer Paulo Freire, that learning, to be meaningful, needs to be as 
existential and experiential as possible (1991). The language used in 
facilitating such learning is important. Common observation suggests that 
Malawians (and, perhaps, Africans, generally) have difficulty linking the 
                                                            
1 Since 1999, the University of Malawi, with the technical cooperation of the 
government of Germany through GTZ, has been running a series of conferences on 
the need for First Language Instruction in Malawi and beyond. This paper is a product 
of a presentation at one of these conferences that was held in 2007. To-date, there 
have been about six of these conferences. For more information on this debate, which 
has drawn in specialists from South Africa, Zambia, Uganda, Malawi, etc. the reader 
is referred to the series of conference proceedings which can be accessed at the Centre 
for Language Studies (CLS), University of Malawi, Zomba. 




knowledge they supposedly gain in school with their immediate environment 
and their lived experiences in it. In other words, there seems to be a yawning 
gap between what they “know” and what they are supposed to “understand” – 
by which is meant what they practice in their environment and lived 
experiences. This development has led to a lack of broad-based initiative and 
creativity among the populace since the citizenry do not see how they can 
harness their environment to improve their livelihoods. But, further to this, the 
‘arbitrariness’ sentence passed on language by Saussurean and post-
structuralist theories of language seems to suggest that words exist as free-
floating signs that have no organic or necessary relationship to the entities or 
referents they designate. This view of language casts doubt on the rootedness 
(however contingent) of human subjectivity, given that language is an 
expression of that subjectivity – even if mediated hence, partial. 
 
In other words, according to the above theorists, there is no necessary or 
“organic” relationship between the sign and the referent; rather, so the 
argument goes, the relationship is purely conventional and arbitrary.  What 
this seems to suggest is that language pre-exists subjectivity and not that 
subjectivity gives rise to language. As a consequence, humans are deemed to 
be divorced from the reality around them because their subjectivity is 
grounded in language which is itself divorced from the reality it only 
“pretends” (because it is merely conventional) to represent.  The overall view 
in this school of thought is that it is not individual humans who produce and 
own language; rather, language is seen as a gift, handed down to humans for 
their benefit by a thoughtful process or being that pre-exists humans such as 
society  - as a collective (as in Saussurean and post-structuralist linguistics).2 
 
This mystification of language (see Stokoe, 2001) is part and parcel of 
Cartesian linguistics. It is reflective of the general trivialization and 
deprecation of the body in a dichotomous conception of human subjectivity 
characterized by the mind/body binary according to which the supposedly 
non-material mind is privileged over the material body. From such a point of 
                                                            
2 Or, in our case, a colonizer or former colonizer (in the case of English, French, 
Portuguese, etc.), or even a hegemony-minded post-independence political 
dispensation (as was the case with the imposition of Chichewa as the Malawian 





view, any language will do for the instruction of pupils in schools (thereby 
courting the real danger of serious ontological alienation) provided that the 
signs constituting that language are learnt – itself not an easy task where the 
First Language happens to be different from the language of instruction. 
 
Such conceptions of language as presented above are very likely mistaken 
because like all human praxis, language is an ontological phenomenon; it is an 
aspect of consciousness and, in the physicalist tradition that taps from the 
neurosciences, consciousness (for a long time regarded as non-physical) is an 
embodied phenomenon. From such a viewpoint, in and through language a 
particular people communicate to one another and, in translation, to those 
outside their group, the message: “This is how we (the individual ‘we’ for the 
most part) have neuro-physically experienced, interpreted and organized our 
encounter with our corner of the universe and this is how we define our place 
in it”.3 Each language is an expression of an encounter with, and interpretation 
of, the universe. Each language is a unique worldview and the initial system of 
signification that one encounters is critical to subsequent developments – 
intellectual or otherwise. 
 
However, a particular people’s universe is not all the universe there is out 
there; hence it is enriching to be exposed to other languages besides one’s 
own. As the Ganda of Uganda have it: Atanayita atenda nyina okufumba (‘The 
untraveled man praises his mother’s cooking’ - Finnegan, 1976: 402). In 
relation to language, the point here is that each and every language, being a 
worldview that it is, may have something to teach to the other languages much 
as it may also have something to learn from them. As such, for a richer and 
better rounded understanding of the universe, each and every language needs 
to be accorded its rightful place and status among the polity of languages. As 
such, where a foreign language has to be learnt as a subject, there is need, 
                                                            
3 It needs noting that while language may seem collective on the face of it, it is neither 
collective nor static. Signs/words should not be viewed as calcified/ossified and given 
entities that were handed down to first human beings. Signs/words are recreated by 
each subject in her or his own way, from her or his own positionality.  Much as 
language and subjectivity interact (both are aspects of consciousness), ultimately, in 
‘authentic’ forms of subjectivity it is individual Subjects that create language out of 
their pragmatic interaction with the brute reality around and in them rather than the so-
called conventional language that creates the Subjects’ subjectivity.   




throughout the period of the student’s learning of such a language, and in the 
lower classes especially, to translate that foreign language into the closest 
approximate local words (or words from cognate languages). The instructor 
needs to make clear the reasons why there may be a need for the students to be 
exposed to different languages – the reasons are mostly social organizational 
or power relational, but also in the interest of the cross-fertilization of ideas. 
 
In light of the foregoing, my paper explores how the relationship between 
words and concepts impacts on conceptuality in an instructional setting and 
how that is related to the language of instruction used. Adopting the Peircean 
triadic semiotic model of the affective and “organic” relationship between the 
sign and the referent (in a pragmatic sense), the paper argues that the 
relationship between words and concepts is not as arbitrary as Saussurean and 
post-structuralist language theorists posit.  
 
Consciousness, Concepts and Language 
Post-structuralist theory has seized on the supposedly troubled relationship 
between the sign and the referent (according to Saussurean linguistics) to 
proclaim our alienation from “objective” or brute reality by arguing that we 
have access to such a reality only through language which is itself not a 
representation of reality–in-itself and that, as such, the only reality we have is 
the one we construct through language which comprises free floating 
signifiers and signifieds in endless differential networks. I have no intention to 
comprehensively discuss post-structuralist theory of language in this paper. 
Suffice to say that my position departs from the Saussurean dyadic sign-
referent construction of language (in which the relationship between the sign 
and the referent is arbitrary) and constructions of subjectivity that are said to 
arise from it.  Instead, my approach expresses affinities with the Peircean 
triadic construction of language and subjectivity – advanced by Charles 
Sanders Peirce in several of his writings on semiotics (see, for example, 
Peirce, 1932; Peirce, 1991; Merrell, 2001; Deledalle, 2000). 
 
According to Peirce signs or words are not as arbitrarily related to reality as in 
the Saussurean model. Peirce has three stages of apprehension of reality and 
construction of words, the first of which takes into account the kind of 
conceptuality that happens during the pre-verbal phase in the Subject 





Subject who listens to a word that has been uttered. Peirce posits that 
communication and signs have at least three dimensions to them: 
 
Firstness is a general state of mind in which 
there is awareness of the environment, a 
prevailing emotion, and a sense of the 
possibilities. This is the mind in neutral, 
waiting to formulate thought.  Secondness 
moves from possibility to greater certainty 
shown by action, reaction, causality, or 
reality. Here the mind identifies [or 
constructs] what message is to be 
communicated. Thirdness is the mode of 
signs shown in representation, continuity, 
order, and unity.  The signs thought most 
likely to convey the intended meaning are 
selected and the communication process is 
initiated.4 
 
The emphasis in such a model is on the “pragmatics” of both words and 
conceptuality itself rather than merely on the “semantics” of words. What the 
receiver does with her or his own pragmatic contact with the triadic process is 
very important as it determines what level of grasping (i.e. apprehension and, 
hence, ontological authenticity) she or he will command.5 
 
Similarly, the argument in this paper is that concepts and words are not one 
and the same thing – primary proof of this is the fact that one and the same 
concept can be expressed in different languages. According to post-
                                                            
4   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sign/28semiotics/29 01-07-2007. I am still in the 
process of attempting to understand Peirce and a better established view can be had 
from the writings of Peirce himself as well as from commentators such as Gerard 
Deledalle (2000). My hope is that the present article will stimulate both interest and 
debate in Peircean linguistics which I believe would yield us a viable alternative to 
Cartesian linguistics of whatever shade.  
5  Not that one should necessarily be searching for the etymologies of words as 
Giambattista Vico seemed to be urging (see Edward Said, 1985); rather, one should 
have a personal ‘take’ on the concept of which a particular word is its symbol. 




structuralist theorists, the fact that concepts are expressed as language – as 
words – renders them arbitrary constructs, without any significant relationship 
to “objective” reality in reference to and out of which the mind in fact 
constructs them. I will concede here that it is true that we cannot have either a 
collective or individual access to “objective” reality-in-itself. However, the 
impossibility of this is not because we cannot have access to such a reality 
only through language which is only arbitrarily related to it. The impossibility 
comes from at least three sources. The first is the fact that we each approach 
“objective” reality first, through appearances, which are a form of mediated 
contact through perceptual organs of varying constitution and quality. 
Secondly, because we each approach “objective” reality from a position of 
subjectivity, that is, from a particular point of view (from our positionality or 
situated-ness). Thirdly, objective reality itself is in a state of perpetual flux. 
 
It needs pointing out that Saussurean and poststructuralist linguistics actually 
seem to be part of Cartesian linguistics that, just as in Cartesian autonomous 
subjectivity, seems to specialise in the mystification of what is arguably an 
otherwise entirely natural phenomenon that language is. Chronologically 
considered, concepts pre-exist words and words are only symbols of concepts 
(as representations of representations) but are not themselves concepts – much 
like the shadows on the wall of Plato’s cave. However, even shadows are not 
totally arbitrary since, unless another medium intervenes, shadows reflect the 
shape of objects which they are shadowing.  Indeed, even in the case where 
another medium intervened the explanation for the resulting shadow will take 
into account the nature of the intervening medium. For example, a straight-
looking stick in space looks bent at the point it enters the medium of water 
because water refracts light. In like manner, just as the relationship between 
concepts and phenomena is a mediated one, so is the relationship between 
words and concepts. 
 
As I have noted elsewhere (see Mfune, 2012), philosophy clearly distinguishes 
between a word and its concept. According to philosophers of an Aristotelian 
bent such as Ayn Rand (1990), while a word is a unit of signification, a 
concept, according to philosophical epistemology, is an idea or a mental 
picture of a group or class of objects, formed by combining all their aspects; 
not only in their differences but also their similarities. Concepts exist anterior 





concepts. Concepts are representations of brute reality and words are 
representations of concepts. Nevertheless, language acquisition is contextual 
and existential or experiential; words are not acquired in a vacuum but are 
grasped only in relation to the existents they point towards which process 
gives them both their semantic and pragmatic import. Now, if concepts are 
representations of brute reality as encountered by a Subject, implying 
mediation (constructs), the words that arise to represent this encountered 
reality are, therefore, representations of representations (constructs of 
constructs), hence doubly or multiply removed from the brute reality of which 
the concepts are its “primary” representations. This should explain the 
refracting and, hence, largely alienating quality of language in relation to brute 
reality. But this in no way implies an arbitrary connection (through language) 
between the two. And the fact that concepts are grasped only in relation to the 
actual existents they point to strengthens the case for First Language 
Instruction given that the learners have these primary existents within easy 
reach.6 
 
In this regard, the phenomenon of onomatopoeia points to the likely 
possibility, across-the-board, of the non-arbitrariness of the relationship 
between the signs and their referents in a network of signification. It is simply 
that, unlike onomatopoeic signs, most words are not one-on-one shadows of 
individual or stand-alone referents but are rather even more mediated and 
refracted shadows. Nevertheless, from a physicalist understanding of the mind 
                                                            
6  It is not likely that words are arbitrarily related to the entities they symbolize as 
poststructuralist theory holds. There is a danger of committing the fallacy of appealing 
to ignorance in declaring the relationship between signs and referents arbitrary. The 
argument seems to be that because we have failed to show that signs are necessarily 
related to referents then the two are not related.  Of course a reverse fallacy is also 
possible (and I don’t want to be accused of trying to commit it myself) where one 
claims that because it is difficult to prove the existence of a necessary relationship 
between the sign and the referent then there must be one.  But I think it is safer to 
assume in the present investigation (with the backing of advances in the physicalist 
school of philosophy of mind) that the relationship between the sign and the referent 
simply cannot be arbitrary. As Giambattista Vico observes, whatever words we 
encounter cannot have been “simply emanations from the lips of some primitive 
being” (see Said, 1985: 351). Personally, I think that different words belong to the 
order of signs that Peirce categorises into icons, indices and symbols. 




and consciousness, these cannot be said to be arbitrary or unmotivated 
phenomena. In the physicalist scheme of things, there can be no such thing as 
an unmotivated phenomenon since phenomena occur in networks and 
sequences of actions, reaction and more action. What Saussurean and post-
structuralist theorists call the ‘arbitrary’ is simply the ‘as-yet-unaccounted-
for’, and the difficulty in accounting is owed to the opaqueness of most signs, 
obtaining as they do in huge networks of signification. It is perfectly 
conceivable to infer that in the relationship between phenomena, concepts and 
words, words are doubly or, indeed, multiply mediated or refracted, hence the 
seeming arbitrariness.  
 
It needs noting, though, that, much as language and subjectivity interact (both 
are aspects of consciousness), ultimately, in “authentic” forms of subjectivity 
it is Subjects that create language out of their pragmatic interaction with the 
brute reality around and in them rather than language that creates the Subjects’ 
subjectivity. If the latter were the case we would have the phenomenon of 
having language in the absence of subjectivity which would be an 
“interesting” scenario as it would present language as a mystical “given” and 
not as a natural human construct as I have already noted above. It would be 
plausible to conjecture that there are humans first before there is language and 
humans construct language to satisfy the need for communication. Authentic 
and meaningful subjectivity and communication are dependent on each 
individual creating her or his own pragmatic meaning (and hence own 
language) out of whatever received or semantic language. 
 
Conclusion 
In view of what has been discussed in this paper, and other studies before it, 
the need for First Language instruction cannot be overemphasized. From the 
point of view of the relationship between semiotics and embodied 
consciousness as posited in the physicalist school of the philosophy of mind, 
the referent, the concept and sign are not one and the same thing. They exist in 
the order presented above. However, the three are closely, organically and 
necessarily interrelated (and not arbitrary) in any individual capable of 
conceptuality. Authentic conceptuality takes place in an individual who 
personally has a take on the sign as it points him or her towards the concept 
and the referent. This process of conceptuality/consciousness involves more 





something which the individual can achieve only when she or he has contact 
with the specific referent concerned, either directly or through cognate 
experiences – the situation seems to be as positivistic as that. And chances are 
that more of such referents will be found within the native environs of the 
learner, a situation which makes First Language learning not only more 
meaningful but also imperative. 
 
As I have pointed out above (and as people like Ngugi wa Thiong’o have 
observed elsewhere), any language constitutes a worldview and as such it 
carries with it a whole freight of individual and collective past and present 
experiences and the room for imagination about further ontological 
possibilities. It would seem that only a self-denigrating and as yet ignorant 
individual would willingly give up his or her First Language wholesale in 
meek submission to a foreign language – however more powerful than one’s 
people its bearers may be. In fact Ngugi’s proposal for Africans to write in 
their vernacular first and only afterwards translate into other languages should 
not be dismissed off-hand – especially for those Africans whose first 
languages are not any of the colonial languages. However, as I have already 
noted above, there is also much to be learnt from other languages which are 
also unique worldviews in their own right. As Cesaire (1949: n.p), aptly, I 
think, puts it (excusing the seeming militancy of his summation), “It is not true 
that the work of man is finished, that we have nothing to do in the world, that 
we are parasites in the world, that we have only to accept the way of the 
world. But the work of man has only begun and no [grouping] has a monopoly 
of beauty, intelligence and strength and there is room for all at the rendezvous 
of conquest.”  
 
Beyond the classroom, and in the broader context, for our case in Eastern, 
Central and Southern Africa, the development of a proto-Bantu language as 
lingua-franca would greatly improve our development and socio-political 
standing in this rendezvous of the world stage, not only at the level of self-
regard – which is very important – but even more especially so since not 
everyone can gain native proficiency in English or any of the foreign 
languages. This is not to kill off the presently existing languages – these will 
have to be allowed to thrive and develop – Afrikaans inclusive. Rather the 
goal would be to provide a shared linguistic forum for use in several of our 
socio-political-economic transactions, which are now fast extending beyond 




SADC and COMESA. The same proposal could apply to the different regions 
on the rest of the continent. Nations which know the ontological and 
communicative value of their languages spare no expense in nurturing and 
promoting those languages and African nations should be no different. As far 
as the development of such lingua-francas is concerned, the job for our 
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